An incentive compatible model for eliciting firms’ production function in a development process by AMIN, Aloysius Ajab
Journal of Economics Library 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 2                                June 2015                             Issue 2 
 
An incentive compatible model for eliciting firms’ 
production function in a development process 
 
By Aloysius Ajab AMINa†  
  
Abstract. Development plans with projects are usually designed by developing countries 
including African countries as a major tool for carrying out their development activities. 
Yet in their market oriented economies the governments have problems of allocating their 
scarce resources in the tender process. Thus, an incentive model is formulated for more 
efficient resource allocation and within this framework; decisions taken could be evaluated 
based on the outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
any governments in developing countries formulate policies and use 
development plans which include projects as a major means of 
influencing and directing the development activities of their respective 
countries. The plans usually have a major impact on their economies and generally 
cover a period of one to five years or even longer depending on the development 
activities to execute. Certain development plans are simply a set of quantitative 
targets to be accomplished within a specific period of time. These sets of targets 
which may cover the whole economy or just a component of the economy tend to 
be apparently coherent. The structural adjustment programmes (SAP) implemented 
in several African countries in the 1980s, to some extent, suspended some of these 
development plans. The development plans, which often consist of projects in 
various sectors of the economy are generally translated into specific production 
targets like building of schools and hospitals, roads, dams and infrastructure or 
construction of bridges and public buildings, and providing certain goods for the 
military and government offices. These goods generally have attributes of public 
goods and generate huge positive externalities. Thus, such goods might not be 
adequately provided by the private sector, implying that the government should 
direct their provision regardless of whether they are included in the development 
plans. In this paper, we formulate an incentive model for a more efficient resource 
allocation in the development and tender process. The decision process brings out a 
method of eliciting information and examining the outcomes.  
 
2. Limited Resources 
Despite the relevance of plans to the development process, many of the plans 
are difficult to realize because of constraints which include limited human, 
financial and technical resources, such that the type of development plans designed 
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are usually greatly influenced by the resource constraints facing the different 
countries. This makes it imperative to ensure the most effective and efficient 
utilization of the limited resources existing in the economy; this is important for the 
development process. In these countries, the government plays a critical role 
particularly in mobilizing and allocating resources, and in controlling and 
influencing development activities in the economy. It is worth noting that the 
goods are mainly public goods generating huge positive externalities. However, a 
majority of developing economies are largely market oriented with both the private 
and public sectors playing important roles in the economies. There is substantial 
reliance on private sector and private ownership as means of production and 
decentralized decision-making system for allocating resources underscoring the 
role of the public-private partnership. Material incentives are the principal bases of 
influencing individuals, agents and firms to participate in economic activities. This 
also highlights the important role of the private sector and in particularly firms in 
the economy. It is the private firms, which generally execute development plans 
producing goods and services with public sector partnership. 
In many developing countries there is much deficit in the provision of public 
goods such as education and health facilities, road and transportation infrastructure, 
which are essential infrastructure with positive externalities. As countries 
developed more public goods with better quality tend to be provided to the 
population. Nevertheless, according to Banerjee, Lakshmi & Rohini (2007) the 
provision of public goods can be said to be a function of collective action of the 
population or inhabitants and the government. Hence the population and 
geographical settings are important in providing public goods and services. These 
factors do influence the demand for variety of public goods and the cost of 
supplying those public goods. The more forceful and demanding the population, 
the more the population would tend to obtain public goods. But the geographical 
features would also tend affect the cost of producing the goods.  
Suppose Q is the public good that is produced including the quality in 
community j at time t, H is a set of inhabitants’ characteristics in community j at 
time t and T is a vector of historical and geographical features of where the 
community is located. And letting output of the public good Q to depend on H and 
T, we can specify the following relation: 
 
),( jtjtjkt THfQ =         (1) 
The population’s characteristics include socio-economic homogeneity or 
heterogeneity; the more homogeneous the population is the more cohesive the 
population with less differences in preferences or power. Characteristics would 
also include the distribution of assets and income among the inhabitants. How 
equal or unequal is the distribution of income and assets tends to influence the type 
of public goods demand by the population.  
 
3. Tender Board and Firms’ Problem 
The plans are generally designed with the consultation of the population by the 
governments and implemented by variety of firms. So that the success or failure of 
the plans may mainly depend on the way the firms receive and utilise the resources 
in operating the projects in the plans; and on the information the government, 
represented by the Tender Board, has on the firms and the economy. 
Generally information is dispersed such that only the firms possess detailed 
knowledge about their production technology. While the Tender Board has a better 
insight on the interdependencies of the whole economy, the social objective 
function of the State, the available resources and the economy’s general needs. 
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This is mainly because the Tender Board has more and better information on the 
whole economy. The major problem of the Tender Board is how to maximise the 
society’s objective function (a set of activities in the plan) subject to the 
government’s available resources or budget. So that if the resources are efficiently 
allocated, the social benefit function is also maximised. 
On the other hand, the firm usually maximises the difference between what it 
receives from the Tender Board to operate a project (its revenues) and the amount 
it spends in operating the project (its expenditures). In its private calculation the 
firm’s objective is to minimise the cost of operating or executing a project. Or the 
firm tries to maximise the net revenue (gross revenue minus total cost = profit) 
from executing a project. Generally, while the government (Tender Board) 
attempts to maximise the social welfare (benefit), the private firm attempts to 
maximise its profits. The firm would generally be encouraged to save on 
consumption of expensive inputs and to avoid waste. In a nutshell, it is in the 
firm’s interest to obtain as large amount of receipts as possible and spend as little 
as possible for any given project to maximize profits. Each firm has better 
knowledge of its production function and technology. At the same time each firm 
in the economy has to compete against other firms in order to win a government’s 
project or contract. In such a competitive environment, with the right incentives, 
firms strive to use cost saving inputs and efficient technologies to execute acquired 
projects. 
 
4. Incentive Structure 
The problem posed here is how to design an incentive structure that would 
make it in a firm’s interest to send truthful messages to the Tender Board. The firm 
has private information which needs to be made known to the Tender Board for 
efficient allocation of resources. Without that, there is a mismatch between the 
State objective and that of the firm (De Parikshit, 2014). That is, the firm sends its 
true “cost estimates” that can reflect the true cost function, so that collectively the 
economy can perform efficiently by allocating its scarce resources efficiently. It is 
not easy to design an incentive compatible scheme. However, what we are 
proposing seems an improvement on the existing structure. 
Some of the countries do not have, for example, a central Tender board 
responsible for awarding government projects or contracts; instead the 
government’s budget for the planned period is shared among different government 
departments, sometimes arbitrarily or politically. Those departments in turn have 
offices responsible for giving out the different projects or awarding contracts.  The 
criteria for selecting a firm for any particular project are not well known to the 
firms. This situation generally creates room for potential firms to carry on much 
rent seeking activities, since the ground rules are not well laid out. Even the limited 
skilled manpower (a common characteristic of many African countries) is spread 
throughout the different government departments. This reduces their performance 
as well as generates greater inefficiencies. In general the economy tends to incur 
great social costs from such situations. Hence, it is more efficient to centralise the 
contract granting department in not so large economies which is a characteristic of 
many developing economies. 
The government as a whole knows little about the firm’s production technology.  
So it cannot efficiently allocate the limited resources or carry out efficient 
planning. This situation is worsened by the fact that the firms tend to have little 
incentive to send true estimates to the Tender Board. The firms may benefit more 
by sending exaggerated estimated cost of the project to be executed. Thus making 
it very difficult for the government to know the true cost function of carrying out a 
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particular project in the economy and consequently the true total cost of the plan. 
The result is poor performance of public projects and consequently poor economic 
performance. Because the ‘indicators’ (which the Tender Board obtain from the 
different firms) may not be accurate, they may not be message desirable. Here, we 
propose a structure which can correct some of the defects and mainly elicit 
‘desirable messages’ from the firms and equally make it possible for the Tender 
Board to gain a better knowledge of the economy. This can then put the economy 
in a better growth path. We believe development is enhanced if the government has 
a good knowledge of the economy, especially the cost structure and production 
function or production technology of the economy. The role of the government 
becomes very important in also improving the technology through public 
investment. 
 
5. Formulating an Incentive Structure 
The publishing of the offers and government contracts generate benefits to the 
society, the bidders and the government. The bidders have knowledge of the goods 
and services to be provided, and the government gain from the competition among 
the firms which bid to provide the goods and services. Competition means good 
quality of goods and services to be provided at the lowest cost. 
Each firm or bidder put down a detailed bid including the length of time to 
complete the project, the amount of money and all its inputs necessary to execute 
the project or activity. Firms do not know what the other firms are bidding, nor the 
cost limits of the government (Tender Board). In all the Board should be able to 
select the bid of the firm that can generate the greatest benefits to the economy. 
The bidding process is one round after which the Tender Board gather all the bids, 
analyze the information on all the bids based on the criteria which include time and 
cost in realizing the respective projects. The Tender Board is interested in getting 
the work or project completed in a given time at the lowest cost possible, usually 
requesting shortest time at lowest cost. Usually changes in time and cost may tend 
to vary, the shorter the time limit the more the cost to execute a project. 
Some models show where there are no payments with quasilinear utility, yet 
producing efficient resource allocation. Classic solutions are based on large 
payments to entity which are usually firms (Cavallo, 2014). Instead we base our 
settings on monetary payments to firms. 
We are assuming one relevant well organized Tender Board in an economy 
responsible for all planning activities and implementation of the government’s plan 
containing projects which have the characteristics of being public goods generating 
externalities. As a rule, plans are published with detailed specification of the 
different projects. The second step is that the Tender Board requests firms to 
submit their contingent estimates (which can be used to generate their cost 
functions). For convenience, we regard the estimates or costs as cost functions 
since we can derive the cost functions from their estimates, with the cost functions 
associated with different projects in the plan. The firms’ estimates show their 
projected costs for the different projects within their given production technologies 
or production functions and time. 
While the firms based their calculations on maximising private profits and so 
consider only those variables affecting their net profits - difference between 
receipts and expenditures, the Tender Board considers social costs and social 
profitability. Actually the firms are operating in a market oriented system and they 
regard the output which is a given project ( Q ) as fixed. So the objective of the firm 
is minimising their costs or cost of production. In principle a typical firm chooses 
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its inputs ).........n, (ixi 21= so, as to minimize its costs PXxp i
n
i
i =∑
=1
 subject to 
its technology QXf =)(  where P, X, Q are input price, input and output vectors 
respectively. That is minimize 
 
{ })(
1
xfQxp i
n
i
i −+∑
=
λ                                                                           (2) 
With given output, input prices, the cost minimizing values of the inputs are 
determined from the first order conditions of equation (2), assuming that an interior 
solution exists. With a given output, the rate of technical substitution gives the rate 
at which one input is substituted for another. And the factor price ratio gives the 
rate at which one output should be substituted for another with a given outlay. If 
this condition is not satisfied, outlay can be reduced by substituting one factor for 
another with a given output. Thus with given Q , iP , the input demand functions 
can be obtained as 
 
),( Qpxx ii =    ),........2,1( ni =                               (3) 
 
And from (3) the cost function is derived as 
 
),()(ˆ QpxPQPC ii∑=                                                                                        (4) 
Equation (4) therefore gives the minimum cost of producing Q  with input 
prices within the technological set. Hence, the cost function is obtained from the 
output-constrained minimization problem of the firm. The cost function therefore 
incorporates the production function of the firm.  The cost function contains all the 
economic relevant information of a firm’s technology; it is assumed to have all the 
desirable properties: non-decreasing, homogeneous, concave, and continuous in 
prices. Given these properties the cost function can be derived from the technology 
used.  
The relevant information required by Tender Board is contained in equation (4) 
which can be rewritten as  
 
),(ˆˆ QpCC ii =                                                (4.1) 
Note that Q includes X. (X is input factor as in equation 2.) For convenience, it 
is the firm’s true cost function which the Tender Board wants to know among other 
things. The assumption of linearity of the cost structure may ensure efficient 
decision generating incentive compatibility, but this assumption may not be 
necessary, since the cost function is derived from the information given by the 
firms. 
However when sending its estimates (implying the cost function) to the Tender 
Board, the firm may take into its calculations the number of firms it believes are 
competing for any given project in the plan. Firms generally may not know how 
many other firms are competing for a given project, although they know the 
number of projects as published. For any project, we can assume two situations: 
one in which there are many firms competing for a given project and the other 
when there are few firms competing for a given project. Many situations can exist 
in between.  In the first case, because of competition, a firm cannot afford to 
exaggerate the cost of a project. While in the second case, with very few firms, 
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firms may be inclined to overestimate the cost of a project. There are many firms in 
a competitive market economy. So, generally, firm )(i would include the number 
of firms )(m competing for the project in its cost calculus. For any given project 
firm )(i would give an estimate of the following: 
 
iii Cm
aCC ˆˆ +=      (5) 
Where iCˆ is the true estimate and α  is chosen by the firm as its strategic 
variable for increasing its profits, )1,0(∈α  and iCm
a ˆ  is what the firm makes 
additionally from the project depending on the number of firms )(m . Equation (5) 
can be rewritten as 
 
ii Cm
aC ˆ1 




 +=                  (5.1) 
     So that ii CC ˆ→ , as ∞→m   
When m  is very large then, ii CC ˆ=  and when the number is small this leads to 
equation (5). It therefore imply that revealing the cost function and consequently 
having better information on the economy’s production function also depends on 
the number of firms in the economy. The greater the number of firms the better is 
the information set. Note that we are assuming transparency with no collusion 
among the firms. Information acquisition is very important in this process. 
Providing information or making all the necessary information publicly available 
so as to enhance transparency and efficiency is very important in reducing 
transaction cost in public tender. Given Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, economics 
has been able to “idealize competitive markets”  as yielding best results in a 
decentralized ways with information transmission being incentive compatible in 
such situations, thus being efficient and incentive compatible. Incentive 
compatibility is possible when agents or firms are many especially in a large 
economy so that no one agent can influence market outcomes; that is, agents are 
price takers. 
The Tender Board knows that generally a firm would like to submit cost based 
on equation (5) and the tender Board wants to know only Cˆ  and not C . The 
Tender Board’s problem is how to motivate firms to send the true cost function. 
Since the Tender Board’s major problem is how to allocate the limited 
development funds efficiently so as to maximise the society’s objective function, 
the Board can do this by coaxing the firms to supply their private held information 
especially concerning their production technology. 
 
6. Eliciting the True Preference 
Many incentive schemes may be proposed to induce agents to reveal their true 
preferences. Our structure is quite simple and easily applicable. The Tender Board 
can motivate firms to report their true cost functions, by giving them ‘additional 
rewards’. That is Tender Board can include some ‘side payments’ in the awarding 
of projects. This side payment could be the minimum of estimated costs of the 
other firms. That is the firm with the lowest estimated cost would obtain the 
following for a given project: 
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[ ]ii CC ˆmin=    (6) 
This should motivate firms to reveal their true cost ( Cˆ ). With competition 
among the different firms for a project each firm knows that only the firm with the 
lowest cost or true cost, Cˆ , would get the project. A serious problem to be avoided 
is for firms to reveal ‘sub-estimates’ and later ask for more funds. So there is a 
need to impose very heavy penalties and pursue them vigorously if any breach of 
contract occurs. 
For the firm, if it submits higher estimates, it cannot win the government’s 
project. If it reports its estimates, which are low (true estimates); it may win the 
project or offer. Safeguard are put in place to make sure any firm with lower 
estimates do so and are able complete the project. A firm cannot win the bid and 
later on not unable to complete due to insufficient funds. With a history of abandon 
or incomplete projects due to inadequate funds we must guard against such 
problems. So a firm’s best strategy is to submit its true estimate, or cost function. 
The most efficient firm (with the lowest costs) wins the contract, which means that 
nationally the resources are allocated efficiently. It is quite important to note here 
that with this side payment based on the action of the other firms, each firm now 
faces a social decision instead of its private decision, and thus the need of the 
disclosure of desirable messages. 
But because of the huge amounts involved, this type of side payment may be 
too costly as to make the whole plan infeasible. Instead extra ‘payment’ (positive 
or negative) could be added so as to change the total value of the payments. Hence 
the pay off for firm )(i can take the following form: 
 
[ ] [ ]iiiji CGCC −= += ˆmin                   (7) 
 
where [ ]ii CG − could be carefully chosen by the Tender Board’s so as not to change 
very much the value of min [ ]ijC =ˆ . In fact [ ] 0≤−ii CG  or 0≥ depends on the 
Tender Board’s calculation. It is important to note that [ ]ii CG − iG  is independent 
on the firm )(i ’s action; so it does not affect the non-co-operative action of the 
firm. It is in the firm’s self-interest to submit its true cost function, since in 
principle it obtains ‘more reward’ by doing so and collectively the economy could 
function efficiently. This solves the incentive problem. 
The results seem to imply that the revelation of the true cost function depends 
on the number of firms vying for a project. But the Tender Board could make a 
worldwide offer, calling for tenders or nationally the Tender Board could give out 
the projects at piecemeal. In order to elicit desirable messages; it is more difficult 
in a situation where there are few firms than where there are many firms. A 
problem with a developing economy is the thinness of the private sector; 
consequently the number of competent firms to execute the plan is very small. 
However, getting firms internationally across the border could be a positive way of 
transferring technologies into the domestic economy. The challenge is having the 
domestic firms absorb and adopt or acquire the technologies. On the other hand, 
there must be the willingness of the foreign firms to pass on the technologies to the 
domestic firms. The governments can play a very important role in the area of 
technology transfer or acquisition. 
Thus having all the relevant information, the major problem facing Tender 
Board is choosing the minimum efficient cost for each project in the plan so as to 
minimize the total cost of the plan. Since the budget for the plan is fixed, the 
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Tender Board can maximise the social welfare function subject to the total fixed 
cost. This seems to be more difficult because of the problem of choosing a social 
welfare function. The Tender Board would then tend to minimise the costs of the 
projects. That is given jiQCˆ and F as fixed budget to produce Q  Q(  is a vector 
of projects), the Tender Board 
 
QCMin
n
i
i∑
=1
ˆ                   (8) 
 
Subject to FC
m
j
j ≤∑
=1
ˆ  and the respective firms’ technologies; 
 FCXQF =⇒ ),,(      (9) 
 
where ni ,.........2,1=  and mj ,.........2,1= ; 
nm < or nm >  and 0>F . 
 
For simplicity the time )(t is not included in all the equations above. In 
choosing the minimum cost of producing each project, the Tender Board must 
make sure that the total minimum costs of all the projects do not exceed the total 
budget )(F . This should not pose a big problem to the Tender Board . How is it 
known that a good decision has been taken? This depends on the outcome of a 
deliberate decision making process. The decisions made do produce outcomes. 
Hence one way of judging a given decision is by examining the outcomes. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Analysis is done for a single period, but it could be extended to multi periods. 
There are some advantages of this structure. The main advantage is that firms in 
the economy are motivated to be efficient in doing business with the public sector 
and also in revealing their true cost function to the government’s Tender Board. 
There is, therefore, public private sector cooperation and partnership. This can have 
very profound impact on the economy, ceteris paribus. In fact, the Tender Board 
has better knowledge of the production technology of the economy, when firms 
submit their true cost functions. All this implies that future planning of setting of 
production targets could be used to describe efficient allocation of scarce resources 
among firms in the economy, and collectively the economy can function more 
efficiently. (Note that the Tender Board here is not the former Soviet type of 
planning board, since we are dealing with a market economy). However, this could 
be achieved if and only if each party ‘play’ according to the rules. Neither the 
Tender Board nor firms should break the rules because the breaking of the rules by 
either party may lead to disastrous consequences. An independent entity is usually 
established to enforce the contracts. Hence, very severe penalties are imposed on 
any breach of contract. Systems seem to function very poorly when there are no 
sanctions imposed for law breaking or breach of contract. Developing countries 
generally face the problem of not giving out the appropriate sanction or punishment 
for any wrong doing. The consequences of such laxity in law enforcement on 
African economies sometimes result to incomplete projects. So agents should be 
properly rewarded for their good actions and punished severely for their poor 
actions or impropriety. With appropriate incentives given for good performance, 
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the functioning of the economy is improved and firms continuously improve on 
their technologies, so generating productivity increase and growth.  
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